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Introduction
Following the senseless killing of innocent Americans in politically-
inspired attacks with the threat of more to come, U.S. prosecutors and agents 
are directed to use their skills to prevent terrorism before it occurs.  The 
resulting disruption efforts – a product of creative thinking by government 
personnel of varied backgrounds and talents – are multi-faceted, but are driven 
by such time-tested investigative techniques as electronic surveillance and the 
use of undercover informants.  The efforts include the prosecution of non-
terrorists, including the legal representatives of radical individuals and 
groups, who themselves cross the line into illegal activity, as well as the 
conscious prosecutorial decision to aggressively charge terrorists with non-
terrorism crimes.  Persons and groups targeted by these law enforcement 
actions and their supporters cry foul and complain that the government’s 
actions go too far, raising the specter of a police state, infringing on the 
constitutional protections to freely express themselves and to associate with 
whomever they choose.  They point to the police abuses of the past, arguing 
that American law enforcement cannot be trusted to learn the lessons of 
history.  Unless the body politic rises up in protest, they argue, Americans are 
doomed to repeat the mistakes of an earlier era. 
 
Sound familiar?  The aftermath of 9/11?  Modern debates over the USA 
PATRIOT Act?  In fact, the situation described above occurred some 35 years 
ago, when the FBI undertook an extensive plan to disrupt a number of 1960s-
era radical groups whose self-proclaimed purpose was, in their own words, to 
cause a “holocaust.”1 Looking back, there is no question that law enforcement 
saved innocent lives, although its efforts were somewhat overshadowed by 
some very real and demonstrable excesses.  
1 On 60 Minutes, in what turned out to be his last interview, former 
Black Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver said, “If people had listened to Huey 
Newton and me in the 1960s, there would have been a holocaust in this 
country.”  David Horowitz, “Eldridge Cleaver’s Last Gift,” 
FrontPageMagazine.com, May 13, 1998. 
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Today, we are once again involved in public debates over where to draw 
the line between national security and personal liberty.  What is striking about 
the modern debates is not, as some have argued, that American law 
enforcement, faced with an emerging security threat, is bound to repeat the 
mistakes of the past.  Instead, what is amazing is that these arguments have 
been going on virtually non-stop for the last several decades, and can be 
reviewed by anyone with access to a law library.  
 
Honestly examining the modern history of U.S. law enforcement’s 
response to political violence, one notices something that is rather surprising 
in light of the current rhetoric: it is today’s critics of the Justice Department’s 
counterterrorism efforts who have it wrong.  The critics, rather than American 
law enforcement, are the ones who are ignoring history.  They stress the police 
excesses of the 1960s and 1970s without following this history to its 
chronological next step – the series of massive reforms and the very real and 
meaningful limitations on law enforcement operations that arose out of these 
excesses.  These reforms, which remain with us to this day, were hammered 
out in a very open way over the last three decades by Congress, the courts and 
the public, with a healthy dose of help from the news media.  They include 
enforceable guidelines which guarantee that Americans are not arbitrarily 
targeted for investigation for constitutionally-protected conduct, as well as the 
complete elimination of warrantless entries and electronic surveillance.  These 
reforms make a return to the abuses of the past all but impossible, a point that 
seems lost on many of today’s commentators. 
 
Looking at the record of American law enforcement’s approach to 
threatened political violence over the last 40 years, one can appreciate the 
similarity between the threat that existed back then and what we face now.  At 
the same time, if one looks at the court decisions of the last four decades, one 
realizes how the current U.S. counterterrorism enforcement program differs in 
significant ways from what occurred during the Vietnam Era.  Today’s 
program, it seems, has adopted the good while stripping away the bad policies 
of the past.  History shows something else that should be comforting for 
everyone: whenever there is a conscious redrawing of the line between liberty 
and security, American institutions remain an effective bulwark against severe 
abuse and lasting damage.  The American people, through their elective power 
over Congress and the Executive Branch, can always affect change through 
legislation or reorganization that results from widespread legitimate outcry.   
 
Perhaps more significantly, the federal judiciary is always available to 
redress more immediate and individualized forms of law enforcement abuse for 
which legislation is not a practical remedy.    American judges have not been 
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reluctant to interpose their judgment when U.S. security efforts go too far.  
Accepting this premise, particularly when it comes to the power of U.S. courts, 
one cannot blithely ignore the past, since it is history – the use of precedent 
and the principle of stare decises – that is the currency of judicial decision-
making.  Instead, it is necessary to focus not only on the judicial results of 
particular arguments, but also courts they reached their decisions.  As shown 
in this article, American law enforcement should welcome this type of 
historical analysis, for it supports today’s counterterrorism program. 
 
What does the past tell us about the fairness, constitutionality, and 
wisdom of the current U.S. counterterrorism efforts?  In many ways, as shown 
in this article, it establishes the exact opposite of what the critics claim.  
Moreover, the specific manner in which U.S. courts resolved civil liberties 
complaints about U.S. national security efforts 30 years ago show that the 
today’s U.S. counterterrorism enforcement program is neither unprecedented 
nor unconstitutional, something that is inconvenient to today’s critics.  To 
understand this, one need look no further than published judicial opinions.  
History is useful, and it should not be abused.  Today’s debates over the 
PATRIOT Act suggest such an abuse. 
 
This article seeks to demonstrate that point.  Part I reviews the security 
situation that gave rise to some of some of the 1960s-era law enforcement 
excesses, and how American courts resolved complaints about aggressive 
government conduct.  As will be shown, violent radicals of that era used some 
of the same extreme constitutional arguments advanced more recently by 
international terrorists, though without success.  This, however, is not the real 
lesson of this historical comparison.  The better insight comes from opinions 
resulting from some of the more mainstream judicial challenges of that era, 
cases which demonstrate that American courts have not been reluctant to 
review law enforcement actions taken in response to security threats, nor to 
judge the legality of these actions through an exacting historical analysis of 
what was known or believed at the time.  As will be shown, this historical 
process cannot be separated from the national security apparatus we have 
today, irrespective of the tendency of today’s critics to ignore the obvious.  Part 
II deals with the history that is being ignored:  judicial opinions that resulted 
in reforms of our electronic surveillance and investigative guidelines.  Part III 
discusses the historical precedent for many of the allegedly “unprecedented” 
aspects of today’s counterterrorism program.  The Conclusion argues, through 
a modern case example involving a former 1960s radical, that judicial 
remedies – available to all who understand the power of the historical analysis 
and are patient enough to use it – are a consistent remedy available to people 
who fear law enforcement abuses and the prospect of the government “going 
too far” in the war on terrorism. 
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Part I:  The Context of the Times
A. The 1960s Terrorist Threat 
 
Were the FBI’s efforts against the radical groups of the 1960s justified by 
legitimate concerns?  Consider that American law enforcement uncovered a 
plot by American radicals to destroy several Manhattan buildings;2 that 
members of the Weather Underground were charged with a plot to use 
explosives to destroy power lines, a railroad junction, and property of 
Bethlehem Steel Works,3 as well as killing two cops and a security guard during 
a robbery of an armored truck, 4 and with executing an escape from San 
Quentin prison that resulted in the death of inmate George Jackson and five 
other persons;5 that during the murder trial arising out of the latter incident, 
Jackson's brother entered the Marin County courthouse and took the trial 
judge hostage.  The judge was killed in the parking lot during a gun battle 
between his abductors and the police.6 Around this same time, leaders of the 
Black Afro Militant Movement (BAMM) organization gave instructions to a 
gathered group in Miami on how to assemble explosive and incendiary devices, 
to – in their words – prepare the members of BAMM for "the coming 
revolution."7 Individual members of African-American revolutionary groups 
were prosecuted for murdering police officers and government informants in 
Philadelphia, New York, New Haven and Cleveland.8 White radicals, in a show 
of solidarity with their black peers, placed dynamite at the Central Intelligence 
2 United States v. Shakur, 418 F.2d 243 (2nd Cir. 1969).  
 3 United States v. Heckman, 479 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1973). 
 4 United States v. Boudin, 543 F.Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); United 
States v. Dohrn, 560 F.Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
 5 United States v. Spain, 543 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1982).  
 6 Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1989).  
 7 United States v. Featherstone, 461 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972).  
 8 United States v. Abu-Jamal, 1997 WL 527349 (D.D.C. 1997), 2000 WL 
1100784 (E.D. Pa. 2000), United States v. Jones, 41 F.3d 238 (6th Cir. 1994), 
United States v. Williams, 730 F.2d 882 (2nd Cir. 1984), United States v. Bell,
820 F.Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).   
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Agency offices in Ann Arbor, Michigan.9 Politically-motivated individuals in 
several cities – New Orleans, New York, Milwaukee, San Diego, Albuquerque, 
Miami, and Salt Lake City – hijacked commercial airliners, in one case ordering 
the pilot to fly the plane into a Tennessee nuclear reactor when it appeared 
their demands would not be met.10 Was the political violence of this era real or 
imagined?  According to figures contained in a 1972 Supreme Court brief 
submitted by the Attorney General, there were 1,562 bombing incidents – most 
of which involved Government-related facilities – in the United States in the 
first six months of 1971.11 
Putting aside the issue of how U.S. counterterrorism enforcement efforts 
in the 1960s and 1970s were implemented, it cannot be said that the radical 
groups of this era should have been left to their own devices, allowed to 
operate happily unencumbered by any law enforcement scrutiny.  Their violent 
activities, particularly when considered in the aftermath of 9/11, speak for 
themselves. 
 
B. Hyperbolic Arguments 
 
To be fair, few modern critics suggest that the U.S. should ignore the 
threat of international terrorism.   They instead focus on the means with 
which U.S. prosecutors and agents are trying to achieve their new public safety 
mandate.  Like their predecessors of the earlier era, the critics sometimes rely 
on odd constitutional arguments that courts have no trouble rejecting.  These 
arguments represent the easy lessons of history, in terms of how American 
9 United States v. Sinclair, 916 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1990).  
 10 Miami Herald, “Life worse in Cuba, unhappy Black Panthers wail,” 
June 26, 1969;  The Baton Rouge State Times, “Ex-SU student ends Cuba 
exile,” September 12, 1986; Miami Herald, “Hijacker is glad he’s back in US, 
rails at reds,” October 29, 1980;  Milwaukee Journal, “71 hijacker gets terms 
of 15 years,” September 6, 1978; LA Times, “Man Pleads Guilty to 1971 
Hijacking of Airliner to Cuba,” October 25, 1975; The Boston Globe, “From 
Cuba, An Exile Looks Homeward,” February 27, 1989;  Miami Herald, “Miami 
hijacking suspect arrested,” December 5, 1983; LA Times, “Tennessee narrowly 
dodged bullet in tense '72 hijack episode crime: Three desperate men 
threatened to crash a commandeered passenger jet into a nuclear reactor to get 
airline to meet their ransom demands,” September 23, 2001;  LA Times,
“Hijackers - They’re Still Flying High,” August 4, 1983.  
 11 Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 311 n. 12 (1972). 
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courts view political violence.  The American judiciary has never accepted that 
argument that the act of killing innocent people is protected by the United 
States Constitution.  
 
Hyperbolic arguments about the constitutionality of the U.S. 
government’s counterterrorism efforts are nothing new.  They were voiced 
several decades ago, and are eerily similar in substance to complaints voiced 
more recently by international terrorists and their attorneys. 
 
Consider the case of Laura Whitehorn, Timothy Blunk, Alan Berkman, 
Susan Rosenberg, Marilyn Buck, Linda Evans, and Elizabeth Duke, members of 
the so-called Armed Resistance Unit.  Twenty years ago, they were charged 
with a plot to bomb several federal buildings and military installations within 
the United States.  In their motion to dismiss, they advanced some strange 
arguments.  They claimed that the indictment should be dismissed because it 
was brought to harass and punish them for the exercise of their First 
Amendment rights, and because the United States was guilty of "war crimes" in 
Nicaragua, Grenada, Puerto Rico, South Africa, Israel, Lebanon, and several 
other countries, as well as against American Indians. They claimed the word 
"violent" within the indictment should be stricken because it was unduly 
prejudicial.   They objected to references in the judicial proceedings to 
“terrorism,” including the FBI agents' statements that they are members of the 
“Joint Terrorist Task Force,” claiming that the terms were unduly provocative.   
They argued that the courtroom security measures, if maintained during the 
trial, would deny them their constitutional right to a fair trial.  They 
maintained that they could not be convicted because no one was killed or 
injured in the bombings they planned, and that the object of the alleged 
conspiracy was largely legal and protected associational activity.12 
The trial court had little trouble disposing of these arguments.  In his 
most pointed language, Judge Harold H. Greene wrote: 
 
This claim – that they are being prosecuted and 
punished for their political beliefs and activities – runs 
like a bright thread through almost all of the 
defendants' motions and supporting papers.   None of 
those assertions, no matter how often repeated, can 
obscure the fact, however, that the defendants are 
being prosecuted for bombing the United States 
Capitol, the National War College Building at Fort 
12 United States v. Whitehorn, 710 F.Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1989).  
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McNair, the Computer Center at the Washington Navy 
Yard, and the Officer's Club at the Washington Navy 
Yard, or that the conspiracy count further alleges that 
they also bombed the Federal Building on Staten 
Island, the South African Consulate, the Israeli 
Aircraft Industries Building, and the Patrolmen's 
Benevolent Association Building, all in New York.   
None of these acts falls into the category of "beliefs" or 
"political activities." . . . Bombings are violent acts, and 
defendants have no immunity from prosecution for 
such acts merely because they also hold protected 
beliefs or, for that matter, because they hold beliefs 
that may be abhorrent to the government and to many 
citizens.   This proposition can easily be tested.   
Suppose that one of these particular defendants had 
been arrested in the act of selling illegal drugs or of 
robbing a liquor store.   Could it reasonably be 
maintained that he could not legally be prosecuted by 
the government for these offenses on the basis that he 
is not popular with that government?   Of course not. 
Prosecutorial vindictiveness cannot be inferred from 
the fact that the prosecutors are determined to bring 
to justice those who, they have reasonable cause to 
believe, have engaged in a series of bombings.   
Prosecutors are presumably equally determined – and 
properly so – to bring to justice other individuals who 
commit other serious crimes.   Prosecutors are 
expected to be unsympathetic to lawbreakers, as are 
most law-abiding citizens.13 
Years later, when the U.S. faced a more modern brand of terrorist, some 
of these same arguments were revived.  A blind Egyptian cleric, Sheik Abdul 
Rahman, was the leader of a group of persons who were ultimately convicted 
in October 1995 in New York of seditious conspiracy14 and other offenses 
arising out of wide-ranging plot to conduct a campaign of urban terrorism in 
the United States.  Included in the charges were plots to kill Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak, to provide assistance to the February 1993 World 
Trade Center attack, and to orchestrate a series of simultaneous attacks on 
13 Id. at 803. 
 14 18 U.S.C. § 2384. 
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such New York-area landmarks as the United Nations’ Building, the Federal 
Building and the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels.   
 
Rahman’s lawyers unsuccessfully argued that the indictment should be 
dismissed on the grounds that it was based on nothing more than his 
expression of political views and his performance of pastoral functions, and 
that it charged him with conduct protected by the First Amendment.  Judge 
Mukasey’s response to this argument, like Judge Greene’s from years earlier, 
was brief:   
 
The motion seems based on misapprehension of three 
things:  what crimes the indictment charges, what acts 
may constitute commission of such crimes, and what 
evidence may show that such acts occurred. The 
indictment charges in Count One that Rahman 
conspired to levy a war of urban terrorism against the 
United States, in Count Two that he conspired to 
murder a foreign official, in Count Three that he 
conspired to bomb buildings and other structures, and 
in Count Seven that he used or carried destructive 
devices during and in relation to violent crimes or 
aided and abetted (including counseled or 
commanded) others in doing so.   To be sure, those 
crimes, like most others, may have a component of 
speech in the course of their commission.   Indeed, it 
is the rare offense, particularly the rare conspiracy or 
aiding and abetting offense, that is committed entirely 
in pantomime. However, that speech – even speech 
that includes reference to religion – may play a part in 
the commission of a crime does not insulate such 
crime from prosecution. . . . It is both possible and 
permissible to charge that criminal statutes were 
violated entirely by means of speech. . . . Further, that 
speech may sound constitutionally protected does not 
mean that it is, if that speech was intended and likely 
to generate imminent criminal action by others. 
Finally, even speech protected by the First 
Amendment may be received as evidence that conduct 
not so protected is afoot. For the above reasons, 
Rahman's motion to dismiss must be denied.15 
15 United States v. Rahman, 1994 WL 388297 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
___________________________
How About A Little Perspective? 
J. Breinholt - March 2004 
-11-
 
Thankfully, most reasonable people agree that plots to destroy critical 
U.S. infrastructure and to kill innocent people in the name of some twisted 
political agenda cannot be defended on the basis of one’s First Amendment 
rights, and the mere fact that the violent 1960s radicals unsuccessfully 
advanced arguments similar to those made more recently by the international 
terrorists does not place them in the same category.  Nor does the similarity of 
these arguments reflect on the constitutionality or advisability of U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts from either era.  The historical happenstance of two 
different groups of violent people, decades apart, advancing the same type of 
arguments in an attempt to exonerate themselves from serious criminal 
charges hardly means that these people were connected, nor that they shared 
the same goals or were the same level of criminal culpability.  At most, it shows 
that desperate people try desperate arguments.  It also may reflect merely that 
the defendants in each of these cases were represented by the same type of 
American defense lawyer. 16
As noted, these odd constitutional arguments make for easy decisions by 
the courts, and the lessons from these cases are not significant, other than 
those rare situations when someone claims that murder is constitutionally 
protected.  The greater insight comes from the opinions that reflect more 
mainstream and historically sound arguments.  It is these cases – particularly 
where the courts ruled against the government – that illustrate how judges 
over the past several decades have resolved arguments similar to those being 
advanced today, and whether modern federal law enforcement is ignoring or 
absorbing these rulings as they plan their counterterrorism operations.  
Today’s counterterrorism warriors should welcome this examination. 
 
C. The U.S. Courts and 1960s Terrorism 
 
Did American law enforcement in the1960s and 1970s go too far?  There 
is no question that they did.  The real issue is whether the specific instances of 
“going too far” involved those activities currently being undertaken by today’s 
federal agents and prosecutors, a type of conscientious parsing rarely 
attempted by critics today.   Fortunately, this is exactly the type of analysis 
courts undertake when faced with challenges to governmental conduct.  That is 
16 The late William Kunstler, who represented one of Sheik Rahman’s co-
defendants, argued that Judge Mukasey should be recused from the Sheik 
Rahman case because he was Jewish and therefore a Zionist and thus was 
unable to be objective. United States v. El-Gabrowny, 844 F.Supp. 955 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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case law is important. 
 
Published judicial opinions concerning law enforcement activities in the 
1960s and 1970s are a rich source of insight, and fascinating reading when 
one considers the more recent debates over security and personal privacy. 
Although the Department of Justice and FBI were able to effectively disrupt a 
number of lethal Vietnam-era terrorist plots – a point frequently overlooked by 
commentators – their overall efforts against radical groups were closely 
scrutinized, heavily criticized, intensely challenged by investigative targets, 
and, in many cases, publicly censured by federal judges.  The result was a 
series of legal reforms which are firmly institutionalized, and are now a 
permanent part of our legal landscape.  They make a return to the bad-old-days 
virtually impossible.  This should be reassuring to all but those who are 
inclined to believe the worst about federal law enforcement.   
 By reading the actual cases, one quickly sees the fallacy of today’s critics’ 
“historical” arguments. One should start with the case that set the standard 
for what constitutes excessive governmental scrutiny of organized political 
activity: Socialist Worker’s Party v. Attorney General, in which private citizens 
succeeded in collecting damages from the United States for overaggressive 
investigative techniques and excessive surveillance.17 
The lawsuit started on July 18, 1973, when the Socialist Workers Party 
(SWP), its youth arm, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), and several 
individual members brought an action against the United States and certain 
individual U.S. officials.  The plaintiffs, followers of the Trotskyist branch of 
Marxism, contended that they had been improperly viewed by various 
Government agencies as threats to national security.  They objected to the 
infiltration, disruption and harassment they had allegedly suffered over the 
past 40 years, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages.  The 
original complaint was a class action, and included the Attorney General as a 
defendant.  An amended complaint, filed in May 1976,  included a claim 
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).18 
The non-jury trial lasted approximately seven weeks, from April 2 to 
June 25, 1981.   The bulk of the evidence at the trial and the discussion in the 
briefs related to the plaintiffs’ allegations of wrongdoing by the FBI and the 
Department of Justice.   The plaintiffs complained about four types of FBI 
17 Socialist Worker’s Party v. Attorney General, 642 F.Supp. 1357 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 18 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671 et seq. 
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activity – disruption, surreptitious entries or burglaries, use of informants, 
and electronic surveillance (telephone wiretaps and "bugs" in offices and 
dwellings).   They also complained about two programs implemented by the 
Department of Justice and the FBI, the Security Index/ADEX program and the 
loyalty-security program for federal employees.   In connection with the second 
program, the SWP was included in the so-called Attorney General's list (now 
terminated) as a subversive organization. 
 
In the end, the trial court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to an 
award of damages under the FTCA from the United States for the FBI's 
disruption activities, surreptitious entries and use of informants.    The SWP 
was awarded damages in the amount of $42,500 relating to disruption 
activities, $96,500 for the surreptitious entries, and $125,000 for the use of 
informants, or a total of $264,000.  The SWP's damage claim for electronic 
surveillance was dismissed for failure to comply with the procedural 
requirements of the FTCA.  The requests for declaratory and injunctive relief 
were denied because there was no present or threatened activity which 
warranted such a remedy.  
 
A major factor in the court’s decision was whether the FBI and certain 
other agencies of the Federal Government could reasonably have believed at 
the time that the SWP presented a threat of revolutionary or subversive activity 
against the United States, thereby justifying certain investigative techniques 
and other measures.  This required the court to undertake an analysis of SWP’s 
ideology and chosen means. 
 
The court found that it would have been reasonable for U.S. Government 
to take the view that Lenin and Trotsky believed in the denial of democracy, 
and that they advocated totalitarian rule imposed by military force and terror.  
At trial, the SWP acknowledged that it was in favor of revolution, but simply as 
a means for transforming society, and that the revolution would come about 
through a historical process only after the capitalist system had exhausted 
itself.   According to the SWP, the revolution cannot be brought about by a 
putsch or coup, or the action of a minority, but only through broad mass 
action.   The court found that the SWP believed in using the electoral process in 
this country to have the workers gain control of the government, and then 
amending the Constitution to carry out the nationalization of property 
required by their economic program.   SWP claimed they were not interested in 
initiating violence, but that since the capitalist class would use violence to 
prevent the democratic process from running its course, the workers would 
then resort to armed force to defend themselves.  This, according to the court, 
demonstrated that SWP has not deserted the theory and example of Lenin and 
Trotsky favoring ultimate violent revolution.  
___________________________
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The SWP leaders testified that terrorism was totally contrary to the 
doctrine of their party, and that it distracted attention and efforts from the 
development of a mass movement.  In 1972, for example, the SWP criticized 
the attack on Israeli athletes in Munich by “Black September," a Palestinian 
terrorist group.   The SWP, while sympathizing with the Palestinians, issued a 
statement that such terrorist tactics are "ineffective and in fact harmful to the 
Palestinian struggle."   In 1974 SWP leader Mary Alice Waters wrote a report 
denouncing the assassination of Spanish Prime Minister Carrero Blanco by 
terrorists.  These factors led the court to conclude that, while the SWP 
embraced violent revolution as an ultimate goal, it realized it had no power 
under current circumstances to carry it out; the fact that it ultimately desired 
a revolution did not mean that its ideology was antithetical to the political 
system of democratic processes of the United States.   On the question of 
whether SWP practiced violence, the court concluded that it did not, citing the 
fact that the FBI had conducted an intensive investigation of the group for over 
30 years and had not prosecuted a single SWP or YSA member for any terrorist 
act.  Notably, the court contrasted this to the “numerous acts of violence and 
destruction in recent times in the United States, particularly during the late 
1960's and early 1970's.”  
 
It is important to put the SWP ruling into perspective:  an ostensibly 
non-violent group had been subject to government surveillance for some 35 
years and, except for one early exception, the FBI had failed to turn up 
anything against them to suggest criminal activity.19 The court’s review of that 
long history of FBI surveillance showed that no FBI informant ever reported 
an instance of planned or actual espionage, violence, terrorism by SWP or 
efforts to subvert the U.S. governmental structure.  Over the course of 
approximately 30 years, there was no indication that any informant ever 
observed any violation of federal law or gave information leading to a single 
arrest for any federal law violation.   
 
Could this be said of al Qaida, Hamas, Hizballah or any of the other 
modern terrorist organizations whose U.S.-based representatives have been 
captured and charged by federal law enforcement over the last few years 
19 According to the Court, the FBI's investigation of the SWP started with 
a series of directives issued by President Roosevelt to J. Edgar Hoover in 1936. 
In 1941, 18 SWP leaders were prosecuted under the Smith Act (18 U.S.C. § 
2385) for advocating the overthrow of the United States.  Dunne v. United 
States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir.1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790, 64 S.Ct. 205, 
88 L.Ed. 476 (1944). 
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alone?20 If SWP is the benchmark, these more modern groups and their 
American sympathizers have a long way to go – and much to demonstrate 
about their non-violent nature – before they can successfully claim that the 
current scrutiny is unfair or unwarranted.  Moreover, unlike the situation 
giving rise to SWP, today’s counterterrorism efforts are more transparent, in 
that they are focused on targets who defined more clearly than people who 
believe violent revolution is inevitable and a good thing.  The American 
counterterrorism program currently focuses on specific groups whose names 
have been published, for all the world to see.  This is the State Department list 
of “designated foreign terrorist organizations.”21 
What is remarkable about SWP is the exacting analysis undertaken by the 
court regarding the nature of the aggrieved organization and the 
reasonableness of the government’s actions, in light of what it knew at the 
time.  That type of analysis not something many of today’s critics would likely 
welcome, if applied to those entities on whom most of the Justice Department’s 
efforts are currently focused.  This is partly because, unlike early days of the 
SWP investigation, the focus of today’s counterterrorism efforts is clearly 
defined: it is those groups that have been designated publicly by the Secretary 
of State In today’s world, counterterrorism efforts are focused on those groups 
listed by the State Department as “designated foreign terrorist organizations,” 
a list that is public 
 
There are additional lessons from other 1960s-era judicial opinions, 
falling into three categories that are hotly debated in the post-9/11 climate: 
electronic surveillance, investigative discretion, and the various tools of law 
enforcement that fall within the category of “disruption.”  There is also the 
broader lesson which should give comfort to people on both sides of the 
current debates: U.S. courts remain available to correct any true transgression 
by federal law enforcement.  
 
20 The true difference between SWP and these groups is shown by the fact 
that, since 9/11, the Department of Justice has charged over 50 individuals (in 
17 different judicial districts) with crimes directly related to assistance they 
provided to a number of terrorist groups, including al Qaida, Hamas and 
Hizballah. 
 21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189.  The full list and description of the designated 
foreign terrorist organization is contained in the annual State Department 
publication, Patterns of Global Terrorism,
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19991.htm.  
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II. The Legal Reforms
A.     Electronic Surveillance 
 
Today’s critics occasionally argue that the USA PATRIOT Act represents 
an unprecedented increase in the government’s power to monitor private 
communications.  They frequently point to the announcement that certain 
attorney-client communications in prison may be monitored (which is 
nowhere mentioned in the PATRIOT Act) and the changes to investigative 
authority designed to catch up with technological advances in communications 
services. 22 On occasion, they suggest that the government now has the right 
to eavesdrop on telephone or Internet communications at will, without any 
form of judicial approval.23 This claim ignores history, particularly the well-
documented legal battles over what the Executive Branch can do in the name 
of national security.  Much of this history is contained in the casebooks at the 
law library. 
1.  Wiretaps and  SWP 
The SWP opinion, published in 1986, perhaps contains the best judicial 
description of the FBI counterintelligence function, including the history of 
government-initiated electronic surveillance.   The SWP court’s findings, after 
all, were based on weeks of testimony.  
 
In modern history, FBI investigations were classified as either criminal 
investigations or national security investigations.   According to the court in 
SWP, when a country is conducting "intelligence" activities –  gathering 
information – regarding a foreign power, the latter will frequently attempt to 
22 Section 216 of the USA PATRIOT Act, for example, establishes the legal 
authority to trace computer communications through the application of 
investigative tools that were previously limited to telephone communications.  
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub.L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (Oct. 26, 2001). 
 23 A current ACLU paper, for example, asserts, “Under the Patriot Act, 
the FBI can secretly conduct a physical search or wiretap on American citizens 
to obtain evidence of crime without proving probable cause, as the Fourth 
Amendment explicitly requires.” American Civil Liberties Union, “Surveillance 
Under the USA PATRIOT Act,” www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm
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disrupt these activities with "counterintelligence:" operations designed to 
disrupt the intelligence gathering conducted by other countries. 
Counterintelligence and disruption activities have at times been directed by the 
FBI against domestic organizations.  With these groups, the Government's 
concerns were two-fold: the threat that a domestic organization might assist a 
hostile foreign nation in gathering intelligence on the U.S. Government, and 
that such organizations might subvert or sabotage military and other 
governmental activities or engage in acts of violence or terrorism.   
 
The FBI policy concerning the use of electronic surveillance changed 
over the years, as did Fourth Amendment law affecting the legality of certain 
practices.   At the SWP trial, Associate Deputy Attorney General Robert Keuch 
testified about the history of the FBI's policy concerning the use of electronic 
surveillance in national security investigations.  When the FBI was created in 
1920, the policies of both the FBI and the Department of Justice prohibited 
any use of wiretapping.   Ten years later the Bureau of Prohibition, an agency 
of the Treasury Department which had been using wiretaps, was merged into 
the FBI.   The Bureau of Prohibition continued to use wiretaps after the 
merger.   The policies of the FBI and the Department were then changed by the 
Attorney General to allow wiretapping by the FBI upon approval of the 
Director of the FBI and an Assistant Attorney General.   
 
In the 1930's two events impacted this policy.   Congress passed the 
Federal Communications Act of 1934, which provided that "no person not 
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any wire or radio 
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, 
purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any 
person...."24 The Justice Department interpreted the statute as requiring both 
interception and disclosure before there was a violation of the statute. 
Moreover, DOJ took the view that the statute would be violated only by a 
disclosure to some person outside of the executive branch.  Under this view, 
interception and disclosure within the executive branch would not violate the 
statute.    
 
The second event was the Supreme Court's decision in Nardone v. United 
States, which held that, under the Communications Act, evidence or 
information obtained by use of a wiretap was not admissible in a criminal 
trial.25 The Supreme Court extended the scope of this ruling in the second 
2447 U.S.C. § 605. 
 25SWP, supra., 302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275, 82 L.Ed. 314 (1937). 
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Nardone opinion, which held that evidence procured through the use of 
knowledge gained by intercepting communications in violation of the 
Communications Act was inadmissible.26 
In early 1940 Attorney General Robert Jackson briefly reinstated the 
former policy that the FBI would not engage in any wiretapping.    On May 21, 
1940 President Roosevelt sent the Attorney General a memorandum stating 
that in the President's view the Supreme Court did not intend to have its 
decision apply to grave matters involving the defense of the nation.  Roosevelt 
noted that certain foreign nations were engaged in sabotage and "fifth column" 
operations, and that preventive steps by the United States were essential.   The 
President directed the Attorney General, in such cases as he should approve, to 
secure information by listening devices directed to the conversations of 
persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the 
United States, including suspected spies.   These operations were to be limited 
to aliens.  In 1946 President Truman affirmed the policy of having the FBI use 
wiretaps in "cases vitally affecting domestic security." 
 
The FBI developed a similar policy regarding the use of microphone 
surveillance: it could be used to protect against persons or entities thought to 
be subversive of the national security. In 1954 the Supreme Court decided 
Irvine v. California, where a defendant in a state criminal case claimed that 
evidence obtained by installing a microphone bug in his home was improperly 
admitted into evidence.27 The entire Court agreed that the surreptitious 
installation of the microphone in a home and the overhearing of conversations 
there constituted a violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.   However, five 
of the justices held that the state court was not constitutionally required to 
exclude the evidence. 
 
Although electronic surveillance continued, the price of obtaining this 
information was the inability to use it in criminal proceedings.  (This may have 
been one of the reasons criminal cases were not made against SWP and its 
principals.)  This situation changed when Congress passed the Omnibus Crime 
Control Act of 1968, which included a statutory scheme for judicial approval of 
electronic surveillance in criminal cases, now commonly known as “Title III.”  
Ten years later, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA), which provided for a court composed of federal judges to rule on 
26Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 
(1939). 
 27 347 U.S. 128, 74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561 (1954).  
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applications for warrants in foreign national security investigations.28 The 
FISA statutory scheme is discussed infra.
2.    The  Keith Case (1972) 
After considering the lessons of SWP, today’s critics should consider 
another judicial opinion issued 14 years earlier, after the advent of Title III but 
before FISA.  One of the few times the Supreme Court accepted the opportunity 
to evaluate particular Justice Department investigative methods undertaken to 
protect Americans from political violence was at the height of the Vietnam Era, 
in a case commonly referred to as the Keith case. (The case took its common 
name from District Judge Damon Keith, who had issued the order that the 
government was challenging in its Supreme Court petition.)29 
A group of radicals known as the White Panther Party were charged with 
plotting to place dynamite in CIA offices in Ann Arbor, Michigan.  During 
pretrial proceedings, they moved to compel the United States to disclose 
certain electronic surveillance information and to conduct a hearing to 
determine whether this information “tainted” the evidence on which the 
indictment was based, or which the Government intended to offer at trial. In 
response, the Government filed an affidavit of the Attorney General, 
acknowledging that its agents had overheard conversations in which one of the 
defendants had participated.  The affidavit stated that the Attorney General 
had approved the wiretaps “to gather intelligence information deemed 
necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to 
attack and subvert the existing structure of the Government.”  The prosecutors 
asserted that the surveillance was lawful, though without prior judicial 
approval, as a reasonable exercise of the President's power (exercised through 
the Attorney General) to protect the national security.  The district court held 
that the surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment, and ordered the 
Government to make full disclosure to the defendants of their overheard 
conversations.30 The Government then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus 
with the Sixth Circuit, seeking to set aside the lower court’s order.  The court 
found the surveillance was unlawful and that the lower court had properly 
required disclosure of the overheard conversations.31 The Supreme Court 
28 18 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.
29 Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125 (1972).  
 30 321 F.Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
 31 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971).   
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agreed to hear the dispute. 
 
The Supreme Court’s opinion, written by Justice Lewis Powell, noted 
that the statute providing for judicial approval of electronic surveillance in 
criminal cases – Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act32 –
specifically excluded from its coverage the constitutional power of the 
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the country 
against actual or potential attack, or to obtain foreign intelligence information 
deemed essential to the security of the United States.33 This did not resolve the 
issue, however.  Instead, the Court ruled that Congress merely left whatever 
constitutional power that may have existed intact with this provision, without 
necessarily created any new statutory authority. 
 
Acknowledging that the President of the United States has the 
fundamental duty, under Art. II, §1, of the Constitution, to “preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States,” as well as the implicit power 
to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by 
unlawful means, the Court found that the President – through the Attorney 
General – may find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance to obtain 
intelligence information on the plans of those who plot unlawful acts.  As in 
SWP, the Court noted that the use of such surveillance in internal security 
cases had been sanctioned more or less continuously by various Presidents and 
Attorneys General since July 1946.  Justice Powell then proceeded to make a 
clear-eyed statement of what was at stake, using language that would presage 
much of the current debates about the USA PATRIOT Act: 
 
Though the Government and respondents debate their seriousness 
and magnitude, threats and acts of sabotage against the 
Government exist in sufficient number to justify investigative 
powers with respect to them.  The covertness and complexity of 
potential unlawful conduct against the Government and the 
necessary dependency of many conspirators upon the telephone 
make electronic surveillance an effective investigatory instrument 
in certain circumstances.  The marked acceleration in 
technological developments and sophistication in their use have 
resulted in new techniques for the planning, commission, and 
concealment of criminal activities.  It would be contrary to the 
public interest for Government to deny to itself the prudent and 
32 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.
33 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3).   
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lawful employment of those very techniques which are employed 
against the Government and its law-abiding citizens.34 
The Court ultimately affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, rejecting the 
prosecutors’ arguments that warrantless wiretaps in the interests of national 
security were permitted.  In doing so, it rejected the government arguments in 
favor of a complete exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior 
judicial scrutiny.  It reasoned that official surveillance, whether its purpose be 
criminal investigation or ongoing intelligence gathering, risked infringement of 
constitutionally protected privacy of speech.  It recognized the constitutional 
basis of the President's domestic security role, but held that it must be 
exercised in a manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment: through an 
appropriate judicial warrant procedure.  The Court specifically noted that the 
warrant procedure need not involve an adversary proceeding, and that it could 
take the form of an ex parte request before a magistrate or judge: 
 
Thus, we conclude that the Government's concerns do not justify 
departure in this case from the customary Fourth Amendment 
requirement of judicial approval prior to initiation of a search or 
surveillance.  Although some added burden will be imposed upon 
the Attorney General, this inconvenience is justified in a free 
society to protect constitutional values.  Nor do we think the 
Government's domestic surveillance powers will be impaired to any 
significant degree.  A prior warrant establishes presumptive 
validity of the surveillance and will minimize the burden of 
justification in post-surveillance judicial review.  By no means of 
least importance will be the reassurance of the public generally 
that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding 
citizens cannot occur.35 
The language of this ruling is of pivotal importance to the current debate 
over the post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism offensive.  The Supreme Court noted 
that, in light of the distinctions between Title III-authorized criminal 
surveillances and those involving the domestic security, Congress may wish to 
consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those already 
established for certain crimes in Title III.   According to the Court, “Different 
standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are 
reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for 
34 Id. at 311-312. 
 35 Id. at 320-321. 
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intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.  For the 
warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest to be 
enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.”36 
Why is this language so pivotal to today’s arguments?  Within a few years 
of the Keith decision, Congress ultimately did exactly what the Supreme Court 
was suggesting: it enacted a statutory scheme that required judicial approval 
for every wiretap request sought for purposes of acquiring intelligence on 
national security threats.  That statute is FISA.  It controls this area today, and 
spawned an entire office of lawyers within the Department of Justice and a 
surveillance program in which every intrusive investigative step taken within 
the United States in the name of national security is approved in advance by an 
Article III judge.  This law clearly divides government actions into two eras – 
those before 1978 and those after. 
 
With regard to the pre-FISA counterterrorism activities, the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Keith set the stage for a series of lawsuits over warrantless 
electronic surveillance.  In Keith, the Supreme Court explicitly left open the 
question of whether such surveillance was constitutional when undertaken to 
collect intelligence of foreign threats, and that its holding was limited to 
warrantless surveillance directed at domestic threats.37 The question of what 
remedies were available for persons aggrieved by the latter would be addressed 
in the tranche of civil lawsuits opened by Keith.
Among the first to try their hand at suing for illegal government 
surveillance, not surprisingly, were the interceptees from the Keith case itself, 
who – after the Supreme Court’s judgment – promptly sued the United States, 
President Richard Nixon, Attorneys General John Mitchell and Richard 
Kleindienst and FBI Director Patrick Gray, based on claimed violations of the 
Fourth Amendment and Title III.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the government, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of 
Appeals concluded that Mitchell was protected by qualified immunity as the 
plaintiffs had not produced any evidence which suggested he acted in bad faith 
rather than on the basis of adequate facts suggesting  legitimate national 
security concerns.38 The plaintiffs then amended their complaint and 
36 Id. at 322-323. 
 37 Keith, supra., at 308-309.  
 38 Sinclair v. Kleindeinst, 645 F.2d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  
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successfully obtained a change of venue to the Eastern District of Michigan.39
They ultimately failed to show that the government's interception and 
surveillance of conversations between defendants and attorneys violated their 
Sixth Amendment rights, and the lawsuit was dismissed. 40
Meanwhile, American law enforcement did something for which its 
critics rarely give it credit: it cleaned house. The Department of Justice 
conducted a full-scale investigation of the FBI's illegal activities, culminating in 
the April 1978 indictment of former high-level FBI officials L. Patrick Gray, III, 
W. Mark Felt, and Edward S. Miller.   This investigation yielded information 
suggesting that the FBI, and perhaps one or more Justice attorneys, failed to 
disclose surreptitious entries in response to inquiries made by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) in 1974, by several congressional committees in 
1975, and by attorneys involved in the SWP lawsuit. In response to this 
evidence, in April 1978, Attorney General Griffin B. Bell directed FBI Director 
William Webster to conduct an inquiry to determine whether FBI officials acted 
improperly in failing to discover and report all instances of surreptitious 
entry. The FBI investigation which followed was conducted by the FBI's Office 
of Professional Responsibility and led to a report to the Attorney General that 
was released to the public in July 1980.41 
Like the aggrieved citizens in Keith, a number of other persons who 
were the subject of electronic surveillance tried their hands in the civil courts.  
The plaintiffs included members of the Jewish Defense League (JDL) who were 
indicted in May 1971,42 a former member of  President Nixon’s national 
security council staff whose telephones were tapped in an effort to isolate the 
leaking of sensitive foreign policy information to the news media,43 and the 
former RAND Corporation analyst charged with leaking the Pentagon Papers.44 
39 Sinclair v. Kleindeinst , 711 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  
 40 Sinclair v. Kleindeinst, 916 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 41 See Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 42 Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
 43 Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd by an 
equally divided court, 452 U.S. 713, 101 S.Ct. 3132, 69 L.Ed.2d 367 (1981);  
Halperin v. Kissinger, 578 F.Supp. 231 (D.D.C. 1984).  
 44 Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 807 F.2d 204 (D.D.C. 1986). 
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With these cases, it is important to consider how U.S. courts responded to the 
actual lawsuits, rather than to blithely conclude that everything the 
government did back then in the interests of national security was wrong or 
obviously beyond the pale.  Most of these cases were resolved on the question 
of whether the officers in question were entitled to qualified immunity, an 
issue that essentially turned on how “outrageous” was their conduct.   For 
example, in the JDL case, the D.C. Circuit held that the former Attorney 
General could claim qualified immunity from liability for damages for violating 
plaintiff's constitutional and statutory rights by authorizing warrantless 
wiretaps where, at the time the wiretaps were authorized, there was no clearly 
established warrant requirement for national security wiretaps.45 In1985, the 
Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth weighed in on the question of the 
immunity to which government officials were entitled when faced with civil 
lawsuits premised on warrantless electronic surveillance.46 
45 Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  The court in 
Halpern found that former President Nixon was entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law on the basis of absolute immunity and that Kissinger, 
Mitchell, and Haldeman were entitled to summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity.  Halpern, supra. In Ellsberg, the Court of Appeals held that the 
former Attorney General was entitled to qualified immunity in civil damage 
action based upon wiretaps. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, supra. 
46 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), involved 
surveillance that began in 1970 on an antiwar group known as the East Coast 
Conspiracy to Save Lives (ECCSL) which, according to information received by 
the FBI, had made plans to blow up heating tunnels linking federal office 
buildings in Washington, D.C., and had discussed the possibility of kidnaping 
then National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger.  As a result, in November 
1970, Attorney General John Mitchell authorized a warrantless wiretap on the 
telephone of William Davidon, a Haverford College physics professor, for stated 
purpose of gathering of intelligence in the interest of national security. The 
wiretap was in place for 14 months.  One of the persons caught on the wiretap 
was Keith Forsyth, who had a few conversations with Davidon.    Forsyth 
learned of the wiretap in 1972, when, as a criminal defendant facing unrelated 
charges, he sought disclosure by the Government of any electronic surveillance 
to which he had been subjected.  After the Keith decision, Forsyth sued the 
Attorney General, claiming that the surveillance violated Title III and the 
Fourth Amendment.   John Mitchell (who by then had left office and been 
convicted himself for his role in the Watergate scandal) contended that the 
decision in Keith should not be applied retroactively to the wiretap authorized 
in 1970 and that he was entitled either to absolute prosecutorial immunity or 
to qualified or "good faith" immunity.  The Supreme Court found that Mitchell 
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The Keith and Forysth opinions may be interesting, but they are now 
merely historical artifacts.  Why?  Because the 1978 enactment of the FISA 
made these types of claims moot.  It replaced the old system of warrantless 
surveillance with a system for judicial approval in every instance.  Today, law 
enforcement does not engage in warrantless wiretaps on persons within the 
U.S., whether for foreign or domestic intelligence purposes, of the type that 
were at issue back then.  FISA creates the sole legal basis for undertaking these 
types of surveillance activities.  
 
3.       FISA Today  
 
Under FISA, the Executive Branch must seek advanced judicial approval 
prior to engaging in any form of electronic surveillance on persons located 
within the United States, for purposes of collecting information relevant to 
national security.47 Where wiretaps are needed in regular criminal 
investigations, the government relies on Title III of the Omnibus and Crime 
Control Act of 1968.48 The result is a very clear and unmistakable rule: there 
is no such thing as a lawful warrantless wiretap within the U.S.  Put another 
way, warrantless wiretaps by the FBI, no matter how noble the purpose, are 
illegal today. 
 
Whether electronic surveillance is sought under FISA or Title III, the 
requests for authority involves the Department of Justice and the federal 
judiciary.  While Title III requests are presented to federal judges throughout 
the United States, they are reviewed and approved in Washington by the 
Criminal Division’s Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO).  FISA applications 
are presented to a special court that sits in Washington, known as the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).  The FISC consists of U.S. District Court 
judges drawn from around the country, who travel to Washington for FISA-
related business.  FISA authority is overseen by a Department of Justice 
component known as the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review (OIPR).49 
was entitled to assert a qualified immunity from suit and could prevail if he 
proved that he acted in good faith, which would turn on his state of mind in 
November 1970, when he authorized the wiretap. 
 47 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.
48 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. 
49 As of November 2002, OIPR was composed of 31 lawyers and 25 
support staff.  In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (U.S. FISCR 2002). 
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These attorneys, like their prosecutors colleagues in the field, work with the 
FBI is gathering and presenting information to a neutral and detached judicial 
officer.50 
How does FISA differ from Title III?  Few of those differences have any 
constitutional relevance.  Both Title III and FISA require prior judicial 
scrutiny of an application for an order authorizing electronic surveillance.51 
Under FISA, a judge on the FISC grants an application for an order approving 
electronic surveillance to "obtain foreign intelligence information" if "there is 
probable cause to believe that ... the target of the electronic surveillance is a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power," and that "each of the facilities or 
places at which the surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be 
used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”52 Title III allows a 
court to enter an ex parte order authorizing electronic surveillance if it 
determines on the basis of the facts submitted in the government's application 
that "there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has 
committed, or is about to commit" a specified predicate offense.53 With the 
particularity requirements, although Title III generally requires probable cause 
to believe that the facilities subject to surveillance are being used or are about 
to be used in connection with the commission of a crime or are leased to, listed 
in the name of, or used by the individual committing the crime,54 FISA requires 
probable cause to believe that each of the facilities or places at which the 
surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power 
or agent.55 Thus, FISA requires less of a nexus between the facility and the 
pertinent communications than Title III, but more of a nexus between the 
target and the pertinent communications.  Both statutes have a "necessity" 
provision, which requires the court to find that the information sought is not 
available through normal investigative procedures.56 Both statutes also have 
50 See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(FISA court is a "detached and neutral body"). 
 51 50 U.S.C. § 1805;  18 U.S.C. § 2518.  
 52 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3).  
 53 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a).  
 54 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(d). 
 55 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(B).  
 56 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c);  50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(E)(ii), 
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duration provisions;  Title III orders may last up to 30 days,57 whereas FISA 
orders may last up to 90 days for U.S. persons. 58 Title III requires notice to 
the target (and, within the discretion of the judge, to other persons whose 
communications were intercepted) once the surveillance order expires.59
FISA does not require notice to a person whose communications were 
intercepted unless the government "intends to enter into evidence or otherwise 
use or disclose" such communications in a trial or other enumerated official 
proceedings.60
Thus, while Title III contains some protections that are not in FISA, in 
many significant respects the two statutes are equivalent.61 The differences 
between the two statutes do not rise to the level of constitutional proportion.  
Title III procedures, after all, are not constitutionally required.62 
The fact that there is no such thing as a “legal” warrantless wiretap does 
not make for good drama for those who argue that the U.S. is on a dangerous 
course.   Selecting their arguments carefully, many of today’s critics overlook 
the post-Watergate reform that has been in place now for a quarter decade 
(longer than the careers of most current agents and prosecutors).  They would 
have the public believe that, with the USA PATRIOT Act, FISA has somehow 
been repealed, taking us back to the pre-Keith days when law enforcement did 
not need to make any particularized judicial showing in advance of 
undertaking national security-based electronic surveillance.63 
1805(a)(5).   
 57 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). 
 58 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(1). 
 59 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).  
 60 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c).  
 61 It should be noted that, in some ways, FISA contains additional 
protections for prospective interceptees.  For example, FISA has more 
extensive reporting requirements than Title III, compare 18 U.S.C. § 2519(2) 
with 50 U.S.C. § 1808(a)(1), and is subject to close and continuing oversight 
by Congress as a check against Executive Branch abuses.   See S. REP. No. 95-
701 at 11-12.  
 62 In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 737, 738 (U.S. FISCR 2002).  
 63 The most significant change to FISA from the PATRIOT Act involves the 
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Legal history, far from showing that we are likely to repeat the abuses of 
the past, should actually give comfort to people who fear arbitrary, lawless 
action by our nation’s  law enforcers.  The system worked!  There continue to 
be wiretaps, just not arbitrary ones.  That should be sufficient to all but those 
who continue to believe that law enforcement should keep its hands off phone 
lines entirely, an argument that is not frequently made anymore.64 Even more 
comforting is the extensive history of court rulings carefully addressing the 
right of person aggrieved by the FBI’s COINTELPRO to access government 
records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)65 and the regular civil 
discovery rules.66 Through the courts, private citizens can seek redress for 
loosening of information-sharing standards (Sections 218 and 504).  These 
changes amended FISA to change "the purpose" language in 1804(a)(7)(B) to 
"a significant purpose” and added a provision allowing "Federal officers who 
conduct electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information" to 
"consult with Federal law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to 
investigate or protect against" attacks or other grave hostile acts, sabotage or 
international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities, by foreign 
powers or their agents.  50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)(1).   These vital amendments 
have been almost universally heralded as necessary to permit U.S. law 
enforcement to more effectively connect the dots to thwart terrorist attacks.   
See In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (U.S. FISCR 2002)(“FISA's general 
programmatic purpose, to protect the nation against terrorists and espionage 
threats directed by foreign powers, has from its outset been distinguishable 
from ‘ordinary crime control.’   After the events of September 11, 2001, 
though, it is hard to imagine greater emergencies facing Americans than those 
experienced on that date.”) 
 64 This argument was made by Justice William O. Douglas.  In one of his 
last judicial opinions, he filed a dissent which referred to  wiretapping as a 
“dirty business” and a “disease.” In Re Heutsche, 94 S.Ct. 204 (Mem), 
38 L.Ed.2d 140 (1973).  
 65 5 U.S.C. § 552  
 66 See Wilkinson v. FBI, 633 F.Supp. 336 (C.D.Cal. 1986) (FOIA request 
for information by representatives of the National Committee Against 
Repressive Legislation ("NCARL"); United States v. Buck, 1986 WL 14970 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)(subpoena request for FBI records concerning plaintiff); 
Struth v. FBI, 673 F.Supp. 949 (E.D. Wisc. 1987) (FOIA request by members of 
an organization known as the New American Movement (NAM)); Jones v. FBI,
41 F.3d 238(6th Cir. 1994)(FOIA request by representatives of a Cleveland 
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abusive law enforcement actions.  Thanks to Congress, these people are 
entitled to governments records upon which to base their challenges.  This 
realization, comforting to the average citizen, may be difficult pill for today’s 
critics who seek to convince others that we are on the verge of a police state. 
 
B.    Investigative Discretion 
 
If critics ignore the system that is now in place to guard against illegal 
electronic surveillance, they also try to leave the impression – again 
erroneously – that there is nothing to prevent the FBI from going on massive 
fishing expeditions which could ensnare innocent people. According to them, 
the FBI can now freely examine the library and video store records of innocent 
Americans without any factual predicate or articulable suspicion, and that all 
Americans should fear the threat of a tyrannical government scrutinizing their 
entertainment habits.   
 
Of all the complaints about the USA PATRIOT Act, perhaps the one that 
rings the loudest involves Section 215.  By its terms, it merely allows the FBI 
to compel the production of third-party records in the course of a foreign 
intelligence investigation.  Significantly, the words “library,” “libraries,” and 
“librarians” appear nowhere in the PATRIOT Act.  This fact has not prevented 
the organized groups of librarians (who, more than most citizens, may have 
less of an excuse to be misinformed) from arguing that Americans should be 
very afraid. These groups typically fail to explain how these same records were 
always obtainable through a regular grand jury subpoena, issued in such 
criminal investigations as in the UNABOMER case, with rarely a complaint.   
FBI investigations, of course, are governed by internal guidelines that are 
designed to prevent the abuses by rogue agents. These guidelines are also a 
matter of public record, were hammered out through litigation, and are 
discussed extensively in judicial opinions that are available for all to see. 
 
1.  Alliance to End Repression 
group called  "Afro Set" or the "Black Nationalist Party for Self Defense"); 
Cleaver v. Kelley, 427 F.Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1976) (FOIA request for FBI files 
allegedly relevant to requestor’s upcoming state murder trial); Pratt v. 
Webster, 673 F.2d 408 (D.D.C. 1982)(FOIA request for disclosure of sensitive 
FBI records); King v. Department of Justice, 586 F.Supp. 286 (D.D.C. 
1983)(FOIA request for FBI records pertaining to plaintiff’s deceased mother-
in-law); Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882 (2nd Cir. 1984)(FOIA request for FBI 
investigative records). 
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 Consider the 1974 class action lawsuit filed by the ACLU and an entity 
known as the Alliance to End Repression against the city of Chicago and the 
FBI and CIA.  The class action lawsuit alleged the regular parade of law 
enforcement horribles: harassment, infiltration, physical and verbal coercion, 
electronic and physical surveillance, summary punishment, and the collection, 
maintenance, and dissemination of dossiers.  The parties ultimately settled.  In 
a court opinion approving the settlement, the court noted the gravamen of the 
plaintiffs’ complaints: that the official investigations were based on the 
subjects’ lawful exercise of First Amendment rights, and the investigative 
means were overly intrusive and violated the First and Fourth Amendments.   
 
The settlement gave the plaintiffs the equivalent of the injunctive relief 
they sought in the litigation: the FBI agreed to be bound by internal guidelines 
which provided that, in conducting domestic security investigations and 
inquiries, it shall be concerned only with conduct and only such conduct as is 
forbidden by a criminal law of the United States, or by a state criminal law 
when authorized by federal statute. The guidelines specifically prohibited 
investigation conducted solely on the basis of First Amendment activities or on 
the lawful exercise of any Constitutional or legal right.  They prohibited the 
FBI from employing any technique designed to impair their lawful and 
constitutionally protected political conduct or to defame the character or 
reputation of a United States person.  They required that investigations be 
conducted with minimal intrusion consistent with the need to collect 
information or evidence in a timely and effective manner, and in a manner 
reasonably designed to minimize unnecessary collection and recording of 
information about the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights.  The 
settlement limited FBI electronic surveillance in Chicago to that authorized by 
Title III and FISA, and limited FBI warrantless unconsented searches to what 
is permitted by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.   It provided that all 
applicable federal statutes, Executive Orders, and Justice Department and FBI 
regulations governing physical or photographic surveillance, infiltration, and 
data collection, dissemination, and storage be made legally enforceable .67 
All in all, not a bad day’s work for the plaintiffs’ attorneys.  
Nevertheless, they were not yet done.  Eighteen months after this settlement 
was approved, Attorney General William French Smith announced new 
guidelines for FBI investigations,68 which superseded the Levi Guidelines of 
67 Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
 68 The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering 
Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations, March 7, 1983. 
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1976.   The new Guidelines permitted the initiation of investigations based on 
statements that advocate criminal activity or indicate an apparent intent to 
engage in a crime, unless it appear from the circumstances or context of the 
statements that there is a prospect of harm.   Put another way, the 1983 
Guidelines created a general rule that First Amendment-protected expressive 
activity should not form the basis for the decision to initiate an investigation 
on a person or group, but allowed for a limited exception if the statements 
seem indicative of imminent danger. 
 
The plaintiffs in the Alliance found this unpalatable and unsuccessfully 
sought an injunction against the new Guidelines, charging that they were 
inconsistent with the consent decree in that they permitted, in limited 
circumstance, the initiation of FBI investigations based on speech.  The 
language of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling against this injunction was 
remarkable, given the national security challenges we face some 20 years later: 
 
[T]he First Amendment, as currently interpreted, places tight 
limits on the government's authority to punish those who counsel 
or advocate violence.   The Supreme Court's decisions [speak in 
terms of “incitement”] . . . If, therefore, a new sect of religious 
fanatics announced that unless Chicagoans renounce their sinful 
ways it may become necessary to poison the city's water supply, or 
a newly organized group of white supremacists vowed to take 
revenge on Chicago for electing a black mayor, these statements, 
made by groups with no "track record" of violent acts, might well 
be privileged . . . Or suppose the leaders of a newly formed 
organization of Puerto Rican separatists went around Chicago 
making speeches to the effect that, if the United States does not 
grant Puerto Rico independence soon, it will be necessary to begin 
terrorist activities on the mainland United States.   These speeches 
could not, in all probability, be made the basis of a prosecution.   
Therefore, under the interpretation of the consent decree urged by 
the plaintiffs, whereby the Justice Department would have no 
power to investigate anything that cannot be punished, the FBI 
probably could not even investigate any of these hypothetical 
groups.   And since [the plaintiff’s interpretation] applies to all 
investigations, not just investigations of groups, many threats 
made by individuals against other individuals could not be 
investigated either, for such threats, too, enjoy broad protection 
under the First Amendment . . . 
 
We doubt that in agreeing to the consent decree the Justice 
Department tied its hands to such an extent; for if it did, it was 
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trifling with the public safety of the people of Chicago ...  The FBI 
always has investigated people who advocate or threaten to commit 
serious violations of federal law, even if the violations are not 
imminent; and it always will.   It "has a right, indeed a duty, to 
keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of 
crimes;  it is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late 
for prevention."69 
In addition to having the benefit of making perfect sense, this language 
represents a remarkable description of what is at stake in discussions designed 
to hamstring our national security apparatus based on hypothetical fears.  The 
entire Alliance litigation stands as an historical illustration of something the 
current Department of Justice representatives say on the subject of the 
PATRIOT Act:  private citizens are entitled to be heard on what type of police 
authority they will tolerate.   That is the essence of democracy, and everyone 
should embrace this type of healthy dialogue.  Whether the analysis occurs as 
part of the legislative process or through litigation, the main point is that it 
happens.  Since it does, we are hardly approaching tyranny.  In Alliance, 
aggrieved citizens sought redress through litigation, something equally 
available today for those who sincerely believe the PATRIOT Act is 
unconstitutional.70 If the critics opt for that route, however, they cannot 
continue to ignore the rules and tradition of that process, which include a 
consideration of this doctrine known as legal precedent, of which the Alliance 
litigation is part. 
 
In Alliance, the judiciary had a clear reaction to what is now being 
69 Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago, supra., quoting Socialist 
Workers Party v. Attorney General, supra at 256 (2d Cir.1974).  The Seventh 
Circuit  also stated that the FBI “need not wait till the bombs begin to go off, or 
even till the bomb factory is found,” and noted that, between 1970 and 1980, 
domestic terrorist organizations committed more than 400 bombings in the 
United States.   
 70 Modern critics of U.S. counterterrorism efforts have conflated these 
two types of civic challenges, and have undertaken a political effort to enact 
municipal ordinances which forbid state and local from assisting federal 
employees in any “unconstitutional” application of the USA PATRIOT Act.  
These ordinances and the arguments supporting them typically fail to explain 
how federal employees, under the PATRIOT Act or otherwise, are permitted to 
engage in “unconstitutional” acts in the first instance, and how individual 
state and local officials can judge these violations when they see it. 
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suggested by today’s critics: that the United States should somehow tie its 
hands in the face of threat of those who would kill us.   As the court noted, the 
“FBI cannot hope to nip terrorist conspiracies in the bud if it may not 
investigate proto-terrorist organizations.” While nobody wants her name in an 
FBI investigative file and the knowledge that the FBI monitors groups 
advocating violent change may deter people from associating with them, this 
cost “would be outweighed by the benefits in preventing crimes of violence, 
provided that the FBI did not prolong its investigation after it became clear 
that the only menace of a group under investigation was rhetorical and 
ideological.”  American constitutional protections, at some point, give way to 
the need to protect against real carnage planned by truly violent organizations.  
This recognition – involving the process of line-drawing frequently undertaken 
by professional policymakers, for nationwide applicability – should not be 
shocking to the public.  As the court noted, presciently: 
 
The organizations that the decree sought to protect, organizations 
such as the ACLU and the NAACP, do not go around making 
threats to commit violent acts, and are not the acorns from which 
grow such trees as the FALN, the Posse Comitatus, the White 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the Black Liberation Army, the New 
World Liberation Front, the Republic of New Africa, the Weather 
Underground, the Jewish Armed Resistance, Omega 9, and other 
menacing groups   ... We doubt that any neutral observer would 
think it appropriate that the FBI should be governed by other than 
a uniform national set of investigatory standards – that it should 
operate under one set of constraints everywhere but Chicago, and 
under another and tighter set in Chicago, so that this city can 
become a sanctuary for nascent terrorist organizations.  
 
This court opinion was published 20 years ago, yet today’s critics 
continue to seize on the “abuses of the past,” rather than how real courts 
redressed them, to argue that today’s counterterrrorism efforts are somehow a 
natural regression to what was long ago prohibited.  They apparently believe 
that none of their listeners will check their words against actual history.  
Today’s critics are not, by any stretch of the imagination, the first to ever 
consider these issues.  They should think carefully before throwing around 
such words as “unprecedented.”71 
71 See, for example, “One Year Since September 11: An Unprecedented 
Assault on Democratic Rights,” World Socialist Web Site, 
www.wsws.org/articles/2002/sep2002/dewmo-s11.shtml.
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 2.    Alliance (Revisited) 
 
We need not speculate how the 1981 Alliance to End Repression 
settlement be viewed now, in light of the more modern terrorist threat or the 
FBI’s reaction to it.  The Alliance litigation came back in the 21st Century, this 
time at the hands of the city, which sought relief from the terms of the 1981 
consent decree to allow their public safety officers to meet the growing threat 
of international terrorism.  The resulting Seventh Circuit opinion, published 
nine months (to the day) before the events of 9/11, offers little support to 
those who claim that courts do not understand or agree with what the 
Department of Justice is currently doing : 
 
The City wants flexibility to meet new threats to the safety of 
Chicago's citizens.  In the heyday of the Red Squad, law enforcers 
from J. Edgar Hoover's FBI on down to the local level in Chicago 
focused to an unhealthy degree on political dissidents, whose 
primary activity was advocacy though it sometimes spilled over 
into violence.  Today the concern, prudent and not paranoid, is 
with ideologically motivated terrorism.  The City does not want to 
resurrect the Red Squad.  It wants to be able to keep tabs on 
incipient terrorist groups.  New groups of political extremists, 
believers in and advocates of violence, form daily around the 
world.  If one forms in or migrates to Chicago, the decree renders 
the police helpless to do anything to protect the public against the 
day when the group decides to commit a terrorist act.  Until the 
group goes beyond the advocacy of violence and begins preparatory 
actions that might create reasonable suspicion of imminent 
criminal activity, the hands of the police are tied.  And if the police 
have been forbidden to investigate until then, if the investigation 
cannot begin until the group is well on its way toward the 
commission of terrorist acts, the investigation may come too late to 
prevent the acts or to identify the perpetrators. 72 
It would seem that judicial language, coming just months before 9/11 
and the USA PATRIOT Act, would be relevant to those willing to undertake a 
serious effort to understand the lessons of history.  That conclusion, of course, 
assumes they care about history and have done their legal research.73 The 
72 Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 73 As I was working on this article in late 2003,  I read the following 
exchange in the pages of the  New York Times. According to Anthony Romero, 
Executive Director of the ACLU, “The FBI is dangerously targeting Americans 
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tendency to ignore the past in an attempt to get people to believe the worst 
about America’s cops extends to other areas of U.S. counterterrorism efforts, 
like the prosecution of lawyers, the aggressive use of legitimate investigative 
techniques like the grand jury process, and the prosecution of terrorists for 
non-terrorist crimes, referred to by John Ashcroft as the “spitting on the 
sidewalk” brand of law enforcement.  These policy decisions, like the FBI 
strategy and investigative guidelines in monitoring violent groups, are no 
secret.  They are also neither unprecedented nor unconstitutional. 
 
III. Historical Precedents for Today’s Counterterrorism Measures
A.     They Prosecute Lawyers, Don’t They? 
 
The case of Lynne Stewart brings audible sighs at town hall debates 
about the PATRIOT Act.  Stewart is a well-known New York criminal lawyer 
who defended of Sheik Abdul Rahman, convicted in 1995 of seditious 
conspiracy in New York.  She found herself indicted after 9/11, when the 
Department of Justice discovered that she was using her legal status to help 
Rahman communicate with his radical adherents on the outside, in violation of 
prison rules.  Stewart managed to get some of the charges against her 
dismissed before being recharged by superseding indictment.74 As of this 
writing, her case is pending.  
 
Modern critics point to the Stewart case as the quintessential example of 
who are engaged in nothing more than lawful protest and dissent.  The line 
between terrorism and legitimate civil disobedience is blurred, and I have a 
serious concern about whether we’re going back to the days of Hoover.”  The 
response, by the unnamed FBI official could have been written by the court in 
Alliance: “We’re  not concerned with individuals who are exercising their 
constitutional rights.  But it’s obvious that there are individual who are 
capable of violence at these [anti-war] events.  We know that there are 
anarchists that are actively involved in trying to sabotage and commit acts of 
violence at these different events, and we also know that these large gathering 
would be a prime target for terrorist groups.” New York Times, “FBI 
Scrutinizes Antiwar Rallies,” November 23, 2002, page A1.  It may be entirely 
fair for people like Mr. Romero to disagree on the wisdom of U.S. court 
decisions.  What is not fair is to consciously ignore the fact of these decisions 
in issuing wholesale condemnations of the American law enforcement 
community. 
 74 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp.2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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heavy-handedness by today’s Justice Department.  This arguments is premised 
on the implicit assumption that the United States generally does not prosecute 
attorneys, and its willingness to do so now is somehow outrageous.  This claim 
ignores history. 
 
Consider the case of Arthur Turco, who was admitted to the New York 
Bar in December 1967.  His practice consisted largely of assisting the Black 
Panther Party and its members.  In February 1970, he was arrested in New 
York City and charged with possession of weapons, dangerous drugs, 
hypodermic instruments and with obstructing government administration. He 
was released on bail. In April he traveled to Canada, apparently without 
notifying the New York authorities, to make a speech at McGill University. 
While there, he learned that he had been indicted in Baltimore, Maryland, in 
connection with the murder on July 12, 1969 of Eugene Anderson, a Black 
Panther suspected of being a government informant.  
 
Through an attorney in Maryland, Turco attempted unsuccessfully to 
negotiate a release on bail if he returned from Canada. He remained in Canada, 
obtained a false identification card and assumed the name of Leon Wright, to 
avoid extradition to the United States. When he failed to return home, his bail 
in the New York case was forfeited, and he was charged with bail jumping.  
Seven and a half months after he entered Canada, Turco was questioned by 
Canadian authorities in connection with a general widespread investigation of 
the kidnapping of a Canadian official. The officials accidentally discovered 
Turco’s real identity and learned that U.S. charges were pending against him. 
Turco was brought back to Maryland. 
 
In June and July of 1971 Turco was tried in Baltimore along with Black 
Panther codefendants for the Eugene Anderson slaying.  After three weeks of 
trial the jury could not reach a verdict on the charges against him.  Before his 
retrial he pleaded guilty, in February 1972, to one charge of common-law 
assault in satisfaction of all of the charges in the May 1970 indictments. He 
was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years, with execution of the 
sentence suspended.   In federal court, Turco unsuccessfully challenged the 
constitutionality of the state bar disciplinary action taken against him.75 
Simply stated, the current prosecution of Lynne Stewart is not without 
precedent.  Being a licensed professional does not immunize you from criminal 
liability when one gets too close to the criminals you represent and the 
75 Turco v. Monroe Country Bar Association, 554 F.2d 515 (2nd Cir. 
1977).  
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Department of Justice lawyers have always been ready to charge fellow 
members of the bar when they step over the line, in a variety of cases that 
stretch beyond terrorism.76 Complaints by defense lawyers about this fact 
predate 9/11.77 Lynne Stewart is not the first attorney to find herself in the 
dock.  
 
B.   The Grand Jury Process 
 
If one recognizes the value of keeping an eye of terrorists in our midst, it 
is probably a small step to accept the inevitability of using all legal resources 
available for that task.  The key to thwarting any terrorist plot is information.  
American law enforcement today would be remiss if it did not use everything 
in its power to obtain information relevant to public safety.  That means 
aggressively using something that has been with us since the beginning of our 
constitutional form of government: the grand jury process.  In the federal 
system, the grand jury meets in private, and its deliberations are secret.  It is 
illegal for prosecutors, court reporters, or jurors to describe what goes on 
behind its closed doors.  Any person who has ever served in this role will attest 
to that.  
 
The federal grand jury was created by the U.S. Constitution, which 
means it is not going away anytime soon.  Although modern critics sometime 
liken it to a medieval star chamber when it begins to focus its immense 
investigative power, the fact remains that grand jury operations are the subject 
of well-defined legal principles. 
 
One such principle is this: the grand jury is entitled to any information 
that is not “privileged.”  The term “privilege” is based on the legal recognition 
76 See United States v. Cuento, 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir.1998); United States 
v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995); United States v. Goulding, 26 F.3d 656 (7th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Cintolo, 8181 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.1987); United 
States v. Robinson, 15 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 1994).  In the attempted San Quentin 
prison escape during which inmate George Jackson and several prison guards 
were killed (described in Part I.A), a civil rights lawyer named Stephen 
Bingham was accused of smuggling the gun used by Jackson during a legal 
consultation.  See Paul Liberatore, The Road to Hell: The True Story of George 
Jackson, Stephen Bingham and the San Quentin Massacre (Atlantic Monthly 
Press, 1996). 
 77 See Barry Turow, “Yes, You Can Be Prosecuted for Providing 
Traditional Legal Services, The Champion Magazine, January/February 1999. 
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that certain types of relationships should be sanctified and promoted, so that 
parties to these relationships can be open with each other without fear of 
compromising confidences or secrets.  By recognizing a privilege, society 
accepts the notion that the law will protect these qualifying secrets from 
disclosure, even when they are being sought for very important reasons – like 
disruption of terrorism.  The natural corollary is that, when it comes to 
information that can be sought by law enforcement, everything else is fair 
game.  
 
In American federal law, recognized privileges protect confidential 
communications between a husband and wife, between an attorney and client, 
between a doctor and patient, and between a spiritual advisor and penitent.78
They do not protect the communications between a journalist and an unnamed 
source, although claims of “journalistic privilege” have been advanced so 
aggressively that such information is now protected by statute79 and the 
Department of Justice does not request the issuance of grand jury subpoenas 
to reporters without special internal approval.80 
Although it has not yet fully bloomed, there are growing indications that 
today’s critics will soon be claiming that the Department of Justice is abusing 
the grand jury investigative power.  This trend started shortly after 9/11, when 
one court found improper the government’s use of a material witness warrant 
to detain a grand jury witness.81 This decision, hailed at the time as a major 
defeat for U.S. counterterrorism efforts, was ultimately reversed.82 
Before jumping with both feet into this area, critics should consider the 
lessons of similar attempts from 30 years ago when persons held in contempt 
of court for refusing to cooperate with grand jury inquiries into violent 
organizations tried to argue that the process was unfair, unconstitutional or 
illegal.  These persons included a paralegal within an organization established 
78 See Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and corresponding 
Advisory Committee Notes. 
 79 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa. 
 80 See United States Attorney Manual, § 9-19.240. 
 81 United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp.2d 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
 82 United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2nd Cir. 2003). 
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to protect radical organizations from unwanted government scrutiny,83 a New 
York Times reporter specializing in the Black Panther Party,84 staff members of 
The Black Panther newspaper,85 the manager of a radio station who broadcast 
a communique from the Weather Underground claiming responsibility for 
bombing of a government building. 86 In each of these cases, their legal 
arguments failed. 
 
Better yet, those who are tempted to fight the grand jury should consider 
the fate of Weather Underground leader Bernardine Dohrn, now a gainfully 
employed academic in Chicago, who was able to avoid further incarceration by 
being publicly humiliated.  Dohrn was held in contempt of court for refusing to 
comply with the Court's order to provide a sample of her handwriting to a 
federal grand jury investigating a series of robberies, including the 1981 
Brinks robbery in which two New York cops were killed.  After seven months 
of incarceration, Dohrn’s attorneys filed papers in which they claimed – 
apparently in a desperate attempt to emancipate her – that Dohrn, having "a 
view of the law and a view of life and her rights and obligations that is myopic, 
convoluted, unrealistic, childish, and inexplicable,” was “intractable in her 
views and beliefs to the point of fanaticism [and] may well perceive herself as a 
second Joan of Arc[,] now suffering an ordeal that must be endured for the 
causes she believes in, whatever they might be." 87 Dohrn was ultimately 
released, but at the cost of being publicly labeled as a fanatic by one’s own 
attorneys.  To her, this was undoubtedly a painful price to pay.88 
83 In Re Fula, 672 F.2d 279 (2nd Cir. 1982). 
 84 United States v. Caldwell, 92 S.Ct. 2646 (1972). 
 85 Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972) 
 86 United States v. Lewis, 377 F.Supp. 297 (C.D. Cal. 1974) 
 87 In Re Dohrn, 560 F.Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 88 To the extent there is any question about whether famous 1960s 
figures care about how they are perceived by the public, consider the steps they 
have taken when they take offense to how they have been depicted in the 
media.  Following the most racially-charged trial in modern Virgin Islands 
history – arising from the September 6, 1972 mass murder at the Fountain 
Valley Golf Course in St. Croix – the black defendants were convicted.  The 
radical defense lawyers (who had agreed to represent the accused free of 
charge) then took issue with a local news account of a letter the judge had 
received from a fellow jurist complimenting him on his ability to keep the trial 
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C.    Honestly Aggressive 
 
If history denies modern critics the right to complain about the legality 
of electronic surveillance or the unfettered discretion in the hands of law 
enforcement, and the “unprecedented” use of the grand jury and prosecution 
of defense lawyers, perhaps they are at least entitled to argue that the essence 
of  today’s counterterrorism program is without parallel.  Here again, the case 
books shows that the current U.S. counterterrorism program is fully in line 
with what has been attempted and upheld in the past.  If courts have 
disapproved of these practices, in was not in a wholesale way as in the case of 
warrantless electronic surveillance. 
 
It is Robert Kennedy who John Ashcroft credits with one of the key 
tenets of current U.S. counterterrorism enforcement.  Speaking to a conference 
of mayors shortly after 9/11, the Attorney General stated, “Robert Kennedy's 
Justice Department, it is said, would arrest mobsters for spitting on the 
sidewalk if it would help in the battle against organized crime. Let the 
terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visas even by one day, we 
will arrest you. If you violate a local law, we will hope that you will, and work 
to make sure that you're put in jail and be kept in custody as long as possible.”  
Critics should at least credit the government for being transparent in its 
aggressiveness.  They should also consider the not-so-subtle reference to 
history before they refer to what is happening today as without precedent.    
 
The “spitting on the sidewalk” strategy actually goes back even further to 
the Chicago mob wars of the 1930s, when dedicated Treasury agents found a 
tool in the criminal tax laws to put away Al Capone.  Today’s critics do not like 
the fact that modern prosecutors, like their colleagues from the past, are not 
limited to terrorism laws in their efforts to fulfill their new public safety 
mandate of preventing terrorism attacks before they occur, nor that these 
tactics seem to be accepted by the general consensus of the American public.  
Recently, the attacks on the USA PATRIOT Act have noted that it is being used 
in non-terrorism cases, as if that was somehow unexpected.  In response, some 
commentators have noted that many of these non-terrorism, money laundering 
from turning into a circus.  The letter’s writer merely noted that he had 
presided over a Maryland trial involving some of the same defense attorneys, 
and that they had made similar attempts to politicize the case.  As a result of 
the news article, the defense lawyers filed a defamation action against the 
judge and the newspaper.  The lawsuit was ultimately dismissed.  Ratner v. 
Young, 465 F.Supp. 386 (D.V.I. 1979). 
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provisions were inserted into the PATRIOT Act at the insistence of such 
Democratic legislators as Paul Sarbanes, Tom Daschle, and John Kerry.89 
Neither political party, it seems, has a monopoly on civil liberties or a 
muscular national security, which is the reason why we have a careerists in 
high-level law enforcement positions, many of whom were around in the days 
of Bush I and Clinton and whose expertise helped craft and implement the 
PATRIOT Act.  
 
To be sure, using all legal tools to disrupt threatened violence is hardly a 
new thing.  In the 1960s, the Department of Justice sought to disrupt 
organized violence through many of the same non-terrorism tools that are 
being used (and criticized) today.   A number of non-terrorism prosecutions 
against left-wing radicals – ranging from state extortion charges,90 RICO,91 
Hobbs Act,92 the offenses of interstate transportation of stolen property,93 and 
firearms violations94 – were undertaken.
To be fair, certain defendants argued that they were being punished for 
their First Amendment activity. Oscar Mitchell, a job developer for the 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was convicted in St. Louis under the Hobbs 
Act for threatening violence and organizing Black Panther activity against a 
store owner who refused to hire a black manager.  Mitchell claimed his 
extortionate demands were constitutionally protected and that the court 
erroneously refused to permit him to introduce evidence of his benevolent 
intent.   Yusuf Oziz Shabazz, convicted in Detroit of transporting stolen 
American Express money orders across state lines, claimed that, as a member 
of the Black Panthers, he frequently traveled around the country serving as a 
government informant, that he was merely trying to avoid bank transactions 
that would have identified him to his Black Panther brothers who might work 
89 John Berlau, “Money Laundering and Mission Creep,” Insight on the 
News, January 19, 2004. 
 90  Moore v. Newell, 548 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1977). 
 91 United States v. Heckman, 479 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1973); Shakur v. 
United States, 32 F.Supp.2d 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 92 United States v. Mitchell, 463 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1972)  
 93 Shabazz v. United States, 446 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1971) 
 94 United States v. Cecil, 457 F.2d 1178 (8th Cir. 1972) 
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at the bank.  For this reason, he bought the money orders using an alias. Each 
conviction was affirmed.95 
Also not unique is the government’s focus on the charitable status of 
entities linked to terrorists96 or its concern about prison recruitment by 
radical elements.97 Unlike the abuses of COINTELPRO, which are well 
documented, history has not shown that these particular enforcement 
initiatives were widely accepted as examples of the FBI “going too far.” 
 
IV. Conclusion: The Uses and Abuses of History
In the end, no matter how sincerely we believe in the correctness of our 
own position, the actors in the current counterterrorism debate will be judged 
by history.  This is inevitable, as long as history is considered relevant.  Where 
it comes to the law and those who practice it, history should be relevant. This 
article posits that many of those who are quick to claim that history is on their 
side – that Americans who fail to learn from the abuses of an earlier era are 
doomed to repeat them – are themselves engaged in their own form of 
historical abuse.   If several decades from now people look back on the post-
9/11 American and conclude that our nation’s law enforcers and those leaders 
who set policy were on the wrong track, so be it.   If this happens, it will not be 
because American citizens had no recourse in the courts, as some critics have 
suggested.   
 
In his dissenting opinion from the infamous Japanese internment case, 
Justice Robert Jackson wrote: 
 
The military reasonableness of these orders can only be 
determined by military superiors.  If the people ever let command 
of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, 
the courts wield no power equal to its restraint.  The chief 
restraint upon those who command the physical forces of the 
country, in the future as in the past, must be their responsibility 
to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral 
95 Mitchell, supra.; Shabazz, supra.
96 Black Panther Party v. Alexander, 1975 WL 552, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-
1241, 75-1 USTC  P 9376 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 97 O’Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785 (3rd Cir. 1973). 
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judgments of history.98
Justice Jackson’s words were written in frustration, based on his 
colleagues’ finding that military orders are essentially non-justiciable even 
when obviously unconstitutional.  Significantly, his frustration could not 
extent the judicial reviewability of the actions of American law enforcement.  
As a former Attorney General, Justice Jackson knew that federal prosecutors 
and agents operate under the rule of law.  Whatever judicial deference is 
offered to the conduct of the U.S. military in times of war, the same is not true 
(at least not to the same extent) regarding the enforcers of American law.  As 
the cases and statutes described above show, the Department of Justice and 
the FBI are public servants, and those who feel aggrieved by today’s 
counterterrorism enforcement policies do indeed have political and judicial 
remedies.  People who are alarmed by such things as the PATRIOT Act should 
acknowledge that American courts, which operate on the basis of historical 
precedent, remain available and are willing, when necessary, to redraw the 
lines between collective security and personal liberty.  Persons who avail 
themselves of the process, however, need to appreciate history as much as the 
courts do.  If one accepts these rules, the courts will remain a haven.  Just ask 
former Black Panther leader Bobby Seale. 
 
Seale was charged with conspiracy to incite a riot at the 1968 Democratic 
National Convention, in what became known as the Chicago 7 trial.99 The trial 
began in September 1969.  On November 5, a mistrial was declared as to Seale, 
and he was summarily cited with sixteen counts of contempt of court for 
several oral outbursts in the courtroom, and he was sentenced to four years in 
prison.  The government thereafter dropped the remaining charges against 
him.100 
Seale resigned from the Black Panther Party in 1974 because he was 
disgusted by its militancy.  Twenty years later, he was living in Philadelphia, 
working on an unpaid basis as a “community liaison” for Temple University.  
He had published a book entitled  Barbecuing with Bobby Seale, and engaged in 
commercial advertisements for a well-known brand of ice-cream and for a local 
bank.   Following the release of a film entitled “Panther” in 1995, Seale sued 
98 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,  65 S.Ct. 193 (1944) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 99 United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972).  
 100 United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).  
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Gramercy Pictures, PolyGram Filmed Entertainment Distribution, Inc., 
Working Title Group, Inc., and Tribeca Productions, Inc., arguing that the 
film’s portrayal of him violated his privacy by placing him in a false light.  The 
lawsuit turned into a vehicle for arguing the truth about the Black Panther 
Party and his role in it.101 
The court credited the claim that the Black Panther Party engaged in 
overt political activity, such as demonstrations and protests, although it found 
Seale and the Black Panther Party rejected Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s calls 
for non-violent resistance to physical attack.  In his deposition, Seale testified 
that the Black Panthers advocated that black people should own guns for "self-
defense against the racist power structure or any racist who attacked us," and 
that he himself led a group of gun-carrying demonstrators onto the floor of the 
California State Legislature during a protest march in 1967.   The court notes 
that much publicity surrounded the Black Panther Party in the late 1960's 
following several armed confrontations with police in which several Party 
members were killed.  Although by 1969 chapters of the Black Panther Party 
had been organized in several major cities across the country, including 
Philadelphia, the size and strength of the Party started to decline after 1970.   
Huey P. Newton had been imprisoned and convicted of manslaughter in the 
1967 shooting death of an Oakland police officer.  
 
The court’s decision focused on two alleged falsehoods in the movie, of 
which Seale complained: (1) a scene in the film in which his character is 
depicted illegally purchasing firearms, which he claimed departed from his 
deliberate and conscious policy of abiding by the mandate of applicable legal 
codes in order to maintain Party discipline and avoid giving police provocation; 
and (2) a scene which depicts his character and the character of Eldridge 
Cleaver engaging in a verbal disagreement as to whether Party members should 
engage in acts of retaliatory violence against police officers in the wake of the 
assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., which Seale contended was false 
Finding that he had raised an issue of material fact, the district court denied 
the defendants’ motion for summary judgments.102 Seale, however, lost his 
claim following the bench trial.  However, he was able to tell his story, and 
defend his good name.103 
101 Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F.Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996).  
 102 Id. 
103 Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 964 F.Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
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 Bobby Seale, it seemed, cared about the judgment of history.  He was 
heard through the law. 
 
